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On September 30, 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain emerged from his 
plane, grinning at the loud cheers of the crowd assembled nearby.1 He and French Premier 
Édouard Daladier had signed an agreement in Munich, Germany, with two infamous dictators: 
Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini.2 In addressing the crowd, Chamberlain decided to show off 
his recent triumph, declaring, “Here is the paper that bears his [Hitler’s] name upon it as well as 
mine.” He held up the fluttering paper and was greeted once more with cheers.3 Later, at 10 
Downing Street, he declared that he had “brought peace with honour,” adding, “I believe it is 
peace for our time.”4 The Munich Agreement and Chamberlain’s speech elicited mixed 
receptions from the public. The London Times remained overwhelmingly optimistic about 
Chamberlain’s success in preventing war while The Manchester Guardian and The New York 
Times featured the agreement in a negative light. But when Hitler invaded Poland in September 
of 1939, it was clear that Chamberlain’s peace was short-lived. While many continue to regard 
Chamberlain as a failure and criticize his speech and the Munich Agreement, some historians 
have re-evaluated Chamberlain’s reputation and have interpreted his role in a more sympathetic 
light. 
The Munich Agreement was signed in hopes of averting war against Germany. By 
September 1938, Hitler had already made “aggressive moves” to expand Germany’s territory.5 
 
     1“Peace Four Power Conference (1938),” YouTube video, 1:50-2:10, posted by British Pathé 
on April 13, 2014, accessed April 24, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e0uOsPBSKPo 
     2 “As to the Munich Agreement Hug the Facts.” World Affairs 101, no. 4 (1938): 209, 
www.jstor.org/stable/20663172. 
      3 “Peace Four Power Conference (1938),” YouTube video, 2:38-3:00, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e0uOsPBSKPo. 
    4 “Neville Chamberlain’s ‘Peace for Our Time’ Speech,” EuroDocs, Harold B. Lee Library, 
Brigham Young University, https://eudocs.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Neville_Chamberlain%27 
s_%22Peace_For_Our_Time%22_speech 
     5 Milan Hauner, "Did Hitler Want a World Dominion?" Journal of Contemporary History 13, 




Two years earlier, despite the terms agreed upon in the Treaty of Versailles, Hitler marched his 
soldiers into the Rhineland, putting German forces in close proximity to “France, Belgium, and 
the Netherlands.”6 Earlier in 1938, Hitler put Austria under his control (in a move known as the 
Anschluss) and gained more territory and power.7 Now Hitler intended to take the 
Czechoslovakian area known as the Sudetenland, which, like Austria, counted a multitude of 
German inhabitants.8 If Hitler could take control of Czechoslovakia, he could secure more 
“lebensraum” or “living space,” for the German people and try to suppress and remove the 
country’s original inhabitants.9  
Favoring a policy of appeasement, Chamberlain believed that he and other leaders could 
negotiate a diplomatic agreement with Hitler on the fate of Czechoslovakia. He decided to seek a 
negotiation with Hitler over the Sudetenland as “control over British policy” soon fell to 
Chamberlain rather than Parliament.10 According to Frank McDonough, a few months before 
September of 1938, a representative from a group of “German ‘moderates’” met with 
Chamberlain in London and tried to convince him that Hitler had his eye on Czechoslovakia, as 
well as France and Russia. But Chamberlain did not pay much attention to the representative 
because Chamberlain feared that “open threats of force” against Hitler “would hasten the 
outbreak of war.”11  In July, Chamberlain had sent Lord Runciman to discuss a solution with 
Sudetenland residents, but by early September, Chamberlain had shifted away from finding “an 
 
     6“World History in March--March 7, 1936: Hitler Reoccupies the Rhineland” Ohio History 
Connection, uploaded March 8, 2017, https://www.ohiohistory.org/learn/education-and-
outreach/in-your-classroom/teachers-toolbox/march-2017/hitler-reoccupies-the-rhineland. 
     7Milan Hauner, "Did Hitler Want a World," 23. 
     8“How Did Hitler Happen?” The National World War Two Museum, New Orleans, accessed 
April 24, 2020, https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/how-did-hitler-happen. 
     9Hauner, "Did Hitler Want a World,” 23. 
     10 Frank McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement, and the British Road to War 
(Manchester University Press, 1998), 62, accessed via Google Books. 
     11Ibid., 62. 
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internal solution” in the Sudetenland and had decided to talk with Hitler.12 In a speech on 
September 12, Hitler had worsened the shaky circumstances by urging Germans in the 
Sudetenland to “revolt.”13 Chamberlain met with Hitler several times before a final agreement. 
There was some back-and-forth between Chamberlain, Hitler, and the French, especially as 
Hitler tacked on more conditions in order for him to agree to a settlement.14 Czechoslovakia 
would not give in to Hitler’s new terms and “ordered a general mobilization” of its military, and 
France followed suit with “a partial mobilization.”15 Chamberlain’s representative warned Hitler 
that France and Britain would take action to protect Czechoslovakia, to which Hitler appeared 
unfazed. However, on September 29, in Munich, Germany, Chamberlain, the French Premier 
Daladier, Hitler, and Mussolini signed an agreement.16 The Munich Agreement gave Hitler 
control of the Sudetenland, allowing him to send his soldiers into the region from October 1 
through October 10. This move would be supervised by “an International Commission.”17 In 
their eagerness to close the agreement, the four leaders kept the Czechoslovakian representatives 
out of the room in which they signed the final pact.18  
When Chamberlain returned to England on September 30, he met by “an unprecedented 
reception.”19 Buoyed by his success, Chamberlain decided to read aloud another document that 
he and Hitler had signed, supporting Chamberlain’s idea that Hitler was “anxious for British 
 
     12Ibid., 61-62 
      13 “As to the Munich Agreement”  204. 
     14 McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement, 65-69. 
     15 “Munich Agreement: 1938,” Encyclopædia Britannica, updated January 7, 2020, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Munich-Agreement. 
     16 McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement, 65-69.  
     17 “As to the Munich Agreement,” 209. 
       18 “Munich Agreement: 1938,” Encyclopædia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/ 
event/Munich-Agreement. 
       19 “As to the Munich Agreement,” 209. 
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friendship” and peace.20 It was this document that Chamberlain raised in the air for the crowd to 
see. Chamberlain read that the recent agreement demonstrated “the desire of our two peoples 
never to go to war with one another again,” to which the crowd exploded in loud cheers.21 
Furthermore, Britain and Germany would rely on “the method of consultation,” meaning 
diplomatic talks with one another, to settle disputes. Chamberlain concluded that he and Hitler 
would work together to “remove possible sources of difference” and ensure “the peace of 
Europe.” With that, Chamberlain smiled and as he exited to his car, a member of the crowd cried 
for “three cheers for Chamberlain!” and the crowd saluted Chamberlain with “Hip hip, hooray!” 
three times.22 It looked as though the British people had thrown in their support, especially as 
“Chamberlain dolls and sugar umbrellas” (Chamberlain was associated with carrying umbrellas) 
“were offered for sale.”23  
Britons who read The London Times would have felt inclined to agree that the Munich 
Agreement and Chamberlain’s efforts had been a success, as the paper featured a fair number of 
articles praising Chamberlain. On October 6, the paper published a letter written by several 
British Conservatives—the same party as Chamberlain—who thanked Chamberlain for “keeping 
our country out of war” and admired “his courage and determination” in securing negotiations.24 
Two days later, other groups chimed in their thanks to the prime minister. The Cobden Club 
 
     20McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement, 72. 
     21“Peace Four Power Conference (1938),” YouTube video, 2:00-4:15, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e0uOsPBSKPo. 
     22 “Neville Chamberlain’s ‘Peace for Our Time’ Speech,” EuroDocs, Harold B. Lee Library, 
Brigham Young University, https://eudocs.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Neville_Chamberlain%27s 
_%22Peace_For_Our_Time%22_speech; “Peace Four Power Conference (1938),” YouTube 
video, 2:00-4:15, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e0uOsPBSKPo. 
      23 Roger Eatwell, "Munich, Public Opinion, and Popular Front," Journal of Contemporary 
History 6, no. 4 (1971): 122, accessed April 20, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/259689. 
     24“East London Support For Mr. Chamberlain,” The Times, Oct. 6, 1938, p. 9, The Times 
Digital Archive, accessed April 20, 2020. 
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expressed “joy” that “our own country and Europe have been saved from the overwhelming 
calamity of another war,” and a group of Masons applauded Chamberlain’s “untiring efforts to 
maintain peace.”25 On October 7, it was noted that “the Corporation of London” showed its 
admiration for Chamberlain by “offer[ing] the honorary freedom of the City.”26 The following 
day, a gramophone company advertised the “historic words” of Chamberlain’s speech on 
September 27, as well as his address on September 30 when he returned from Munich. Anyone 
who bought the record could relive the historic moment as they listened to “the happy result 
achieved” by Chamberlain. The Times maintained its optimistic view of Chamberlain’s efforts 
because the Munich Agreement and Chamberlain’s professions of belief in long-term peace gave 
the public a “sense of relief,” as the gramophone advertisement correctly noted. 27  
A common appeal made to Chamberlain was to save another young generation from 
destruction. One of the most intriguing letters of gratitude came from a group of schoolboys. The 
boys feared that they would be “the first victims” if war erupted for several years, as young men 
would be sent first to the front lines. The boys noted that there were “many millions of the 
youth” across “the world,” reminding Chamberlain that if he made the decision to go to war, 
another generation would be forced to pay the costly price.28 A bishop also praised Chamberlain, 
calling him “the benefactor of the world” and that Chamberlain’s critics were “‘war-mongers.’” 
The bishop defended his support of Chamberlain, claiming that he and others “felt a very proper 
 
     25“Cobden Club Appeal,” The Times, Oct. 8, 1938, p. 7, The Times Digital Archive, accessed 
April 20, 2020; “Untiring Efforts,” The Times, Oct. 8, 1938, p. 7, The Times Digital Archive, 
accessed April 20, 2020. 
     26“City of London and Mr. Chamberlain: Honorary Freedom to be Offered,” The Times, 
Oct.7, 1938, p. 8, The Times Digital Archive, accessed April 20, 2020. 
     27"Historic Words," The Times, Oct.8, 1938, p. 10, The Times Digital Archive, accessed April 
20, 2020. 
     28"Schoolboys' Thanks To Mr. Chamberlain," The Times, Oct. 8, 1938, p. 7, The Times 
Digital Archive, accessed April 20, 2020. 
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reluctance of sending young men of this country” to war, especially as there were no personal 
feelings of “ill-will” between British men and “their German and Italian contemporaries.”29 The 
bishop saw no justifiable reason to go to war—rather, he argued, the British people had no 
personal animosity towards Germany or Italy. The bishop believed the British people had 
nothing to gain but everything to lose by going to war. Another bishop put it more bluntly and 
wrote that “war with modern weapons is criminal lunacy,” because of the potentially high cost of 
life.30 The British did not want to lose many of their sons, as well as young husbands and fathers, 
to another world war.  
However, even before the Munich Agreement was signed, it appeared that “a sizeable 
body of [public] opinion was critical of Neville Chamberlain’s foreign policy.”31 But in the time 
leading up to the agreement, the British press was largely discouraged from printing negative 
views that could disrupt the ongoing negotiations with Hitler.32 According to Guy Hodgson, The 
Times also leaned “largely pro-German in the 1930s” and backed Chamberlain because its editor 
“was a friend of Stanley Baldwin and Chamberlain and a strong supporter of appeasement,” 
which explains why so many of the paper’s articles praised Chamberlain.33  
Another British newspaper, The Manchester Guardian, posted unfavorable views of 
Germany and the Munich Agreement. On October 1, the paper bluntly stated that “the Munich 
agreement gives Hitler everything he wants (to begin with).” It did not matter that Hitler won 
 
     29“Debt to Prime Minister: “Benefactor of the World,” The Times, Nov. 22, 1938, p. 11, The 
Times Digital Archive, accessed April 20, 2020. 
     30Edwin James Palmer, "The Meaning of Munich," The Times, Nov.8, 1938, p. 10, The Times 
Digital Archive, accessed April 20, 2020. 
     31Anthony Adamthwaite, "The British Government and the Media, 1937-1938," Journal of 
Contemporary History 18, no. 2 (1983): 281, www.jstor.org/stable/260388. 
     32Ibid., 281-282. 
     33Guy Hodgson, “Sir Nevile Henderson, Appeasement and the Press,” Journalism Studies 8, 
no. 2 (April 2007): 321, accessed online through EBSCO Academic Search Premier, 
doi:10.1080/14616700601148952; Ibid., 329. 
7 
 
Czechoslovakia through a diplomatic agreement—it remained an “invasion.” Czechoslovakia 
would fall into Hitler’s full control, as the agreed upon “elections and plebiscites” in 
Czechoslovakia would be “manipulated.”34 A letter to the editor expressed anger that 
Chamberlain had circumvented Parliament in his haste to secure the agreement. This writer 
argued that the British and French had led Czechoslovakia leaders astray. Once the 
Czechoslovakian leaders had accepted the terms, the British and French suddenly seemed to 
“withdraw their promises, destroy their guarantees, and leave the aggressor in charge.” 
Chamberlain’s foreign policy showed that the British government was willing to defend 
“dictatorship in Europe,” the writer concluded.35 “Democracy to-day is weaker than it was last 
week,” another letter writer cried. The writer shook his finger at Britain and the other “once-
called democratic countries,” condemning them in that “you are running away and have no 
ground on which you are prepared to make a stand.”36 Another writer questioned what solid 
evidence Chamberlain had behind his statement that he had “brought us ‘peace for our time.’” “It 
would be desperate indeed,” the writer continued, “if this much-vaunted “peace for our time” 
were to be a cringing peace, a peace gained by throwing sop”—weakened countries like 
Czechoslovakia—“to the dictators.”37 Finally, another letter writer criticized Chamberlain 
because Chamberlain seemed to suggest that “even if the Munich Agreement was a defeat for 
 
     34“Hitler’s New Powers: Czechoslovakia at His Mercy,” The Manchester Guardian, Oct. 1, 
1938, from “The Munich Agreement-Archive September 1938,” The Guardian archive blog, 
posted Sept. 21, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/from-the-archive-
blog/2018/sep/21/munich-chamberlain-hitler-appeasement-1938. 
     35 Hugh Quigley, “Letters on the Munich Agreement: Britain’s “Fascist Grand Council,” The 
Manchester Guardian (1901-1959), Oct. 5, 1938, p. 10, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The 
Guardian, accessed April 20, 2020. 
     36T. Wigley, “Letters on the Munich Agreement: The Democratic Powers on the Run,” The 
Manchester Guardian (1901-1959), Oct. 5, 1938, p. 10, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The 
Guardian, accessed April 20, 2020. 
     37 “For Our Time?” The Manchester Guardian (1901-1959), Oct. 3, 1938, p. 8, ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers: The Guardian, accessed April 20, 2020. 
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this country, no one ought to say so in public.” It was better to maintain “patriotic silence.” But 
the writer pointed out that it was not like a “democratic system” to try to censor free speech. The 
writer also noted that The Times seemed to defend censorship of free speech if it went against 
Chamberlain’s foreign policy.38 Hodgson observed that The Manchester Guardian had been 
much more “critical” of Hitler earlier than other newspapers. The paper took on a more negative 
tone as its horrified editor learned of “Jewish and Christian persecutions and the concentration 
camps,” stories that other newspapers “shied away from” printing. Its negative coverage 
prompted Hitler to ban the paper.39 
 The New York Times agreed with many of the points that The Manchester Guardian 
writers had made and emphasized the uncertainty ahead. The paper remarked that the cheering 
crowd that greeted Chamberlain in London “cared only that he had brought ‘peace,’” happy that 
“bombs were not falling on their little houses.” The paper noted that “most of Mr. Chamberlain’s 
welcomers seemed to be women,” and added that they “probably had not read the terms of the 
Munich Agreement but who remembered the last war” and its costs. The paper suggested that 
these “hysterical” women were only happy that their sons and husbands had been spared from 
war and that anyone who read the agreement would have seen its faults and concluded that the 
peace was only temporary. The paper concluded that “for in spite of the ‘desire of our two 
peoples to never go to war with one another again,’ [quoting Chamberlain] every Briton now 
knows where the real danger to his country lies.” The uncertainty remained, as the paper noted 
that “workmen still were digging trenches by torchlight to give government employe[e]s refuges 
 
     38G. C. Field, “Fouling Our Own Nests, Patriotic Silence” The Manchester Guardian (1901-
1959), Nov. 4, 1938, p. 20, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Guardian, accessed April 20, 
2020. 
     39Hodgson, “Sir Nevile Henderson, Appeasement and the Press,” 331. 
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in case bombing planes should come” from Germany.40 On October 9, the paper captured the 
uncertainty with a map of Europe marked by ten questions. Questions included “Can 
Czechoslovakia survive?” and “Can the German march to the east be halted?” The paper 
described how a powerless Czechoslovakian people, “its spirit all but broken, watched German 
troops” and military vehicles come into the country. The paper painted a sad picture of the 
abandoned Czechoslovakian people while the British people were busy “rejoicing” for their own 
safety. “Recalling what Hitler had written in ‘Mein Kampf,’ men found it hard to believe” that 
Hitler would not try to take hold of other countries, the paper correctly observed. There did not 
appear to be strong faith in Chamberlain’s declaration of peace, as the paper recorded that “a 
great air-raid drill was held in London” recently. It seemed that Chamberlain himself was 
uncertain about the peace, as he “urged Britain to look to her arms,” keeping military options at 
the ready.41 Very few appeared to believe that peace could last for very long. 
Once Britain entered the war in 1939, the Munich Agreement looked like a failure in 
foreign policy and Chamberlain’s dramatic speech about peace appeared laughable in hindsight. 
The negative perception of Chamberlain has persisted through present day. According to Nick 
Smart, Chamberlain did not give Hitler the appearance that “Britain meant business.” He 
mistakenly thought that “Hitler would respond positively” if “more concessions” were made, as 
seen in his negotiations at Munich. Chamberlain refused to listen to the Foreign Office and 
others who warned him that Hitler’s “word could not be trusted,” and he hesitated to use 
intimidation to push Hitler “into a corner.” Smart concluded that Chamberlain “was no analyst” 
 
     40Ferdinand Kuhn Jr., “Peace with Honor, Says Chamberlain,” The New York Times, Oct. 1, 
1938, p. 1 and 4, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, accessed April 20, 2020. 
     41“The News of the Week in Review: The New Europe,” The New York Times, Oct. 9, 1938, 
p. 71, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, accessed April 20, 2020. 
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and operated more on “instinct.”42 Dominic D. P. Johnson also argued that “Chamberlain held 
positive illusions about Hitler’s intentions,” which prompted him to set off on a “dogged pursuit 
of an unlikely peace.”43 Johnson added that after Munich, Chamberlain defended his 
appeasement “in spite of mounting evidence” that showed Hitler was not deterred and that “the 
bulk of the historical evidence” has indicated that the policy was somewhat “unrealistic.”44 
Other historians argued that Chamberlain has been wrongly condemned for his role in the 
Munich Agreement, as well as his speech upon his return to London afterwards. Robert J. Beck 
declared that the characterization of Chamberlain as an “umbrella-toting utopian” was unfair.45 
Beck acknowledged “Chamberlain’s naivete” but also pointed out that the situation was more 
complex than other historians have realized.46 President Franklin D. Roosevelt told Chamberlain 
that the United States would not intervene if war broke out in September of 1938, and 
Chamberlain feared the possibility that Germany and Japan would team up against Britain.47 It 
was also unclear whether Chamberlain could count on the “support of the entire [British] 
Empire.”48 Questioning whether he had enough support, Chamberlain hesitated to make any 
move that would bring Britain into war.  Stephen Rock cited similar reasoning for why 
Chamberlain did not abandon his appeasement policy. As seen in several of the newspaper 
articles, Rock observed that “memories of the First World War [were] still fresh,” reminding the 
 
     42Nick Smart, “Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement,” History Review, no. 65 (December 
2009): 20–25, accessed on Academic Search Premier on April 28, 2020. 
     43Dominic D. P. Johnson, "The Munich Crisis" in Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and 
Glory of Positive Illusions, 86 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), accessed through 
JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvk12rcg.6. 
     44Ibid., 93. 
     45Robert J. Beck, "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered," International Security 14, no. 2 (1989): 
169, www.jstor.org/stable/2538858. 
     46Ibid., 170. 
     47Ibid., 175-178. 
     48Ibid., 174. 
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fearful public of the mass slaughter that had resulted years earlier.49 Rock stated that 
appeasement had worked with “Britain’s enemies in the past” and added that the British 
government did not yet have a “clear” idea of “Germany’s objectives” for the future.50 Rock 
agreed with Chamberlain’s critics, however, that the greatest problem with Chamberlain’s 
appeasement policy was that it “was dominated by wishful thinking,” and that Hitler could see 
resolutions like the Munich Agreement as “signs of weakness.”51 
Chamberlain saw the Munich Agreement as proof that “conciliation and diplomacy” were 
“the best weapons to prevent war.”52 Some historians have harshly judged Chamberlain for his 
erroneous prediction that he had brought “peace for our time” and they have argued that he failed 
in his approach to appease Hitler. Other historians have raised arguments that showed 
Chamberlain had no other policy to follow under the complex situation. In the end, Chamberlain 










     49Stephen R. Rock, “British Appeasement of Germany” in Appeasement in International 
Politics (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 51, accessed via ProQuest Ebook 
Central. 
     50Ibid., 52. 
     51Ibid., 65; Ibid., 67. 
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